Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1989

The Carpet Barn, a Utah corporation, Kenneth
Macqueen, and Harla Macqueen v. State of Utah by
and through its Department of Transportation,
John Nye and John Does 1 through 10 : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Clark W. Sessions; Sessions and Moore; Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellants.
Stephen C. Ward; Assistant Attorney General; Jody K. Burnett; Snow, Christensen and Martineau;
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, The Carpet Barn v. Utah, No. 890315 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1907

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50

D^CKEI NO. * 7 - a

^
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

THE CARPET BARN, a Utah
Corporation, KENNETH MACQUEEN,
and HARLA MACQUEEN,
%# >

Plaintiff-Appellants,

^*i-

t ,-j

a^%.-

/?/

v.
STATE OF UTAH by and through
its Department of
Transportation, JOHN NYE and
JOHN DOES 1 through 10,

Case No. 880047

Defendant-Respondents
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Priority # 14(b)
Clark W. Sessions (2914)
SESSIONS & MOORE
400 First Federal Plaza
505 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellants

Stephen C. Ward (A3384)
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Jody K. Burnett (A0499)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for DefendantsRespondents

111

i &3E^

SEPS
Gie-k, Supreme Court, Utah

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
THE CARPET BARN, a Utah
Corporation, KENNETH MACQUEEN,
and HARLA MACQUEEN,
Plaintiff-Appellants,
v.
STATE OF UTAH by and through
its Department of
Transportation, JOHN NYE and
JOHN DOES 1 through 10,

Case No. 880047

Defendant-Respondents
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Priority # 14(b)
Clark W. Sessions (2914)
SESSIONS & MOORE
400 First Federal Plaza
505 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellants

Stephen C. Ward (A3384)
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Jody K. Burnett (A0499)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for DefendantsRespondents

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

i

I.

1

ARGUMENT
A.

FUNCTIONAL OBSOLESCENCE

B.

THE CHANGE IN ACCESS IMPACTED THE VALUE OF
THE PROPERTY

C.

1

4

THE SEVERANCE DAMAGES AWARDED WERE IMPROPER

CONCLUSION

5
8

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Board of Trustees v. B.J. Service, Inc., 75 N.W. 459,
406 P.2d 171 (1965)
.

7

State by and through Road Commission v. Brown,
531 P.2d 1294, 1296 (Utah 1975)

2

State Road Commission v. Jacobs, 16 Utah 2d 167,
397 P.2d 463 (1964)

2

Utah State Road Commission v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926
(Utah 1974)

7

Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 22
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-134

1, 7
7

-i-

ARGUMENT

I.

r*

s e v e r a n c e *.
are

'

;:

:^;?r

-

;-> a i . v tru; untested Lnat s e v e r a n c e

^ -*

^,v;t
; .

;I

H ^ * --^ ^oi.w -*« * » . , . . .^.^*
.•

r

taking

decrease

^: x *

1L1T1 ju-><. * ompensatioi

__ _.

damages

^e^ore

ill..

;;, v 3 I;t- u v r : ne o r - p e r t y

^ne
be

suffered

r e q u i r e d bj 1:1: le I Jtal: 1 Consti tuti on ,

Section :? /

. ? aLue

lecrease
"furicti

T

^ 1 obsolescence*

nrnneri . ' . n . .
1'

wu

7r

x is

•

^n'UiU oe s u ^ . i : : u

i.:

ittrLbuted

cunu.

^ecame e i i e c i
here

m*.-^

,.

f

n^o^

hange

T M- f-d pq

,t

CaKj..,^.

iccess

caused

-Mr*" , * r h e i r

..*•<• . uiiLent i e n s

by

^erd 1 "

we -indressed

the

r

M

<n

serlatir.

1: ' u n c t i o n a 1 O b s o l e s c e n c e .
f) i
Appeal
d i e

' d a i i!: c i t: e d i i c

a i 11 h o r i t y

* •

.

. ;-roper"v

Vdiut

unless

that

ivper
~ '

oa.c-rcikt

is

^-ru^ed
- i

uy

\u

ci.--'.;il

:c
'

. ...;

on

e n t i : leti

o
i ;

t)[)soies:enct

"

Yet Defendants' entire argument is that any diminuation in value
of Plaintiffs' property is due to "functional obsolesence"-problems in the way the buildings were constructed.

Defendants'

argument focuses only on the buildings and fails to consider the
highest and best use of the property.

In State by and through

Road Commission v. Brown, 531 P.2d 1294, 1296 (Utah 1975), this
Court stated:

"The land owner should get the reasonable value of

his land if put to the highest and best use."

This is true even

if the current use being made of the property is something less
than the highest and best use.

State Road Commission v. Jacobs,

16 Utah 2d 167, 397 P.2d 463 (1964).

The highest and best use of

Plaintiffs' property prior to the taking was commercial.

Both

the Plaintiffs' expert (T. 158) and the Defendants' witness (T.
277) so testified.

Plaintiffs' expert testified that the value

of the land as commercial property was $3.30 per square foot for
a total value prior to the taking of $225,684.00 (T. 184). This
value was in no way tied to the existing structures on the
property, but was simply based on the highest and best use of the
land as commercial property.

Conceding

that the existing

structures, although functional for Plaintiffs' purposes, are not
ideal as commercial structures, does not change the value of the
land as commercial property.

Nor does assigning no value to the

buildings, due to depreciation or "functional obsolescence"
affect the damages proven by Plaintiffs at trial.

-?-

The change in value of the land as a consequence of the
taking is due to the change in the highest and best use to which
the property can be put.

That diminution in value must be

calculated based on the highest and best use of the property
prior to the taking (commercial property valued at $3.30-$3.00
per square footMT. 184, 278) minus the highest and best use of
the property after the taking.
The highest and best use of the property after the taking
was not commercial.

Plaintiffs1 expert testified that the

property was suited only for "light industrial" use (T-159), with
a value of $1.30 per square foot.

Defendants1 expert testified

that "commercial use requires some kind of parking, generally out
in front or alongside.... commercial use does not generally exist
with parking solely in the rear." (T-282).

As a direct conse-

quence of the taking, all of Plaintiffs' store-front parking was
eliminated.

Plaintiffs were left with property having no store-

front parking and no commercial access.

Without access or

adequate parking, the highest and best use that could be made of
the property is light industrial or "something less than commercial." (T-159).
Therefore, the only proper method to calculate severance
damages given these facts is that used by Plaintiffs1 expert
i.e., the value before, as commercial property, minus the value
after, as light industrial property, or "something less than
commercial."

Giving Defendants the full value of their argument
-3-

of "functional obsolescence11 does not cure the defects in the
jury's verdict since their argument deals only with the devaluation of the building and not the land on which it sits.

Any

calculation that does not take into account the change in the
highest and best use ignores the evidence presented at trial is
contrary to long-standing legal precedent and fails to afford
Plaintiffs their full measure of damages.
B.

The Change in Access Impacted the Value of the

Property.
Defendants1 evidence is contradictory.

In essence, however,

the Defendants argue that there was no change in the access to
Plaintiffs1 property.

Defendants do not deny the erection of a

wall and chainlink fence across all but 20 feet of the property.
Nevertheless, Defendants contend that such neither adversely
impacted the access to the property nor its value.
The bottom line is that the highest and best use of the
property changed because

reasonable

store-front parking was eliminated.

access was denied and
Even Defendants1 witness

testified that the access allowed, one 20-foot opening in the
retaining wall and fence, was "not reasonable."

(T. 234)

No

satisfactory explanation was offered by Defendants as to why no
attempt was made to provide reasonable commercial access.
Plaintiffs were not allowed to present to the jury their
evidence of what access was allowed other commercial property
located

nearby

on

Redwood

Road

with

similar

frontage.

Plaintiffs1 proffered testimony and photographs to show that
nearby properties were allowed access over sixty percent of their
total frontage. (T. 338)
was sustained.

(T. 340)

Defendants1 objection to this testimony
Plaintiffs' expert testified that if

the State's construction project had been designed with two
40-foot openings and no retaining wall or fence, the property
could have retained its store-front parking.

(T. 96)

If

Plaintiffs had been provided reasonable commercial access, and
the construction had been planned to allow adequate parking,
Defendants may have had some ground to argue that the taking did
not change either the access allowed or the commercial value of
the property.

However, the facts simply do not support that

argument since Plaintiffs' access was reduced from 192 feet to 20
feet and their store-front parking was completely eliminated.
Defendants' argument that there was no change in access, and thus
no change in value, simply cannot be supported on the facts of
this case.
C.

The Severance Damages Awarded were Improper.

Defendants, at page 12 of their Brief, attempt to distinguish the landscaping costs from their testimony of "cost to
cure" by stating:

"The testimony offered regarding landscaping

had nothing to do with curing the parking problem, but was
offered as a direct alternative to increasing [sic] the value of
the unusable parking strip to something useful." _Id. Defendants
both at trial and on appeal characterize the landscaping as an
-5-

attempt to increase the value of the remaining property (T-294,
Defendants1 Brief P. 12). The cost to landscape the property is
not

a relevant

factor

in calculating

severance damages.

Landscaping costs were not offered as the difference in the value
of the property before and after the taking and that argument
must fail.

Defendants1 direct testimony at trial was that there

was no difference in value before or after the taking.

(T-280)

Defendants1 argument at trial was that the landscaping was simply
a way to increase the value of the remaining property, not that
the landscaping costs represented severance damages.
At Page 14 of their Brief, Defendants attempt to justify the
award given by stating "Plaintiffs were put in as good a financial position as they were before the taking in terms of the
property they owned and were entitled to use.11

(Emphasis added).

The attempt: to qualify this statement is telling and underscores
the weakness in Defendants1 argument.
Defendants1 argument is based on two false premises:

First,

that Plaintiffs1 damages are limited because their buildings are
old and somehow not fully functional for commercial purposes;
thus the qualification "in terms of the property they owned" and
second, that Plaintiffs were somehow not entitled to the access
the property had prior to the taking, giving rise to the
qualification "and were entitled to use."

Defendants fail to

show why Plaintiffs would be unable to recover depreciation in
value attributed

to "functional obsolescence."

Defendants1

functional obsolescence argument fails to make allowance for the
highest and best use that can be made of the property and the
change that occurred in that highest and best use.

Defendants1

second premise, that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to any
consideration for the change in access is not supported by the
facts, and flies in the face of statutory provisions such as Utah
Code Annotated § 27-12-134, and case law such as Utah State Road
Commission v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974).
Defendant cannot reconcile the conflicting positions that
there is "no difference11 in the value of the property before and
after the taking, and that the value of landscaping the former
parking lot somehow represents the difference in the value of the
property before and after the taking.

The landscaping costs were

prospective expenditures which are not proper elements of damage.
See Board of Trustees v. B.J. Service, Inc., 75 N.M. 459, 406
P.2d 171 (1965).

The cost to improve the appearance of the

property by landscaping constituted only a partial "cost to cure"
and does not represent severance damages.
The award of severance damages in the instant case is not
supported by the evidence and the Plaintiffs are not in as good a
financial position as they occupied prior to the taking.

As

such, Plaintiffs have been denied their entitlement to just
compensation as required by Article I, Section 22 of the Utah
Constitution.

-7-

CONCLUSION
The proper calculation of severance damages, based on the
evidence presented at trial, would have to include the change in
the highest and best use of the property and the change in access
caused by the taking.
in the award given.

Neither of these factors were considered
Plaintiffs therefore request that this case

be remanded so that severance damages may be properly calculated
based on the evidence presented at trial and as by law provided.
Respectfully submitted this

day of September, 1988.

CLARK W. SESSIONS
Attorneys for PlaintiffsAppellants
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